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The Retroactive Application of Justice: Using
Prosecutorial Discretion to Correct Sentences that
No Longer Serve a Valid Purpose
Jennifer Smith and Jeremiah Bourgeois
The criminal justice system is centered around three major participants: a
prosecutor, a defense attorney, and a defendant.1 Each plays a role in the
ensuing adversarial process, and each has their own perceptual lenses and
interests. The prosecutor, for instance, seeks a conviction and focuses more
on evidence of guilt than on innocence. The defense attorney endeavors to
bring about a verdict of not guilty or a favorable plea rather than seeking to
promote public safety. As for the defendant, he often cannot perceive the
factors that led to his criminality, and he has neither the insight nor the will
necessary to change his life’s trajectory.
After sentencing, the criminal justice system in Washington State
provides very few mechanisms for any of these participants to undo the
result, even after decades have passed.2 A prosecutor, who “has the
1 The identification of the prosecutor, defense attorney, and defendant as the major
participants in the criminal legal system is not meant to suggest that victims play no part
in the process, but rather that the role of victims is subsumed by the advocacy of
prosecutors and becomes more central at the sentencing phase. See, e.g., Meghan E.
Miller, Victim Impact Testimony in Texas: The Need for Reformation and Clarification, 5
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 121, 124 (1998).
Today, the criminal justice system is dependent on the use of victim impact
testimony throughout the entire process of a criminal case but especially in the
sentencing phase. Witnesses and experts play a major role in the prosecution
and conviction of the accused during the trial phase, but it is the family’s
statements during the sentencing phase that provide justice to the victims.
These statements inform the court, the jury, and the defendant about the impact
of the crime on the victim and the victim’s family.
Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).
2 See, e.g., 13 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASH. PRAC. & PROC. §5002 (3d ed. 2020).
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responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate,”3
may later come to question the fairness of the sentence. However, until
2020, prosecutors lacked the power to reduce the term of confinement.4 A
defense attorney may belatedly find mitigating evidence, but procedural
rules foreclose the opportunity to have the defendant resentenced.5 As for a
defendant who underwent an incredible transformation after a substantial
period of confinement, the only hope for an early release is the unlikely
possibility of a sentence commutation.6 The absence of an effective means
to undo injustice has long been the status quo of punishment in the State of
Washington.7
Legislation enacted in 1989 establishes a one-year time limit for any collateral
attack upon a judgment and sentence in a criminal case, whether by writ of
habeas corpus or PRP, applicable whenever “the judgment and sentence is
valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Id.; see also In re Bush, 193 P.3d 103, 106 (2008).
RCW 9.94A.728(5) provides that “[t]he governor, upon recommendation from
the clemency and pardons board, may grant an extraordinary release for
reasons of serious health problems, senility, advanced age, extraordinary
meritorious acts, or other extraordinary circumstances.” RCW 10.01.120
further gives the governor power to “commute a sentence or grant a pardon,
upon such conditions, and with such restrictions, and under such limitations as
[she] may think proper.”
Id.
3 WASH. R. OF PRO. CONDUCT 3.8 cmt. 1.
4 See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 797 P.2d 1141, 1146 (1990) (“[T]he Legislature provided a
number of limitations within the SRA on the discretion of the prosecutor, and the
prosecutor only acts within the authority delegated by the Legislature.”).
5 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.090(1) (1989) (“No petition or motion for
collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than
one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its
face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.”).
6 In “extraordinary cases” the Governor has the power to commute the sentence of any
offender. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.885. See also In re Bush, 193 P.3d 103, 106
(Wash. 2008) (“Neither the constitution nor the statutes limit the governor’s discretion to
grant, deny, or place conditions on commutations.”).
7 The original SRA provided for elimination of the Board of Prison Terms and
Paroles. It abolished much of the court’s sentencing discretion. The statute established
presumptive sentencing ranges, which were based on the seriousness of the crime and the
offender’s criminal history. Absent exceptional circumstances, the court was required to
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On June 11, 2020, a new law became effective which gives prosecutors
more power to look back at past criminal case outcomes and move the court
to reduce the punishment if it no longer advances the interests of justice.8
The court then checks the prosecutor’s power and is directed to consider the
inmate’s disciplinary record in the Department of Corrections; any evidence
of rehabilitation while incarcerated; any evidence that shows whether the
inmate’s age, time served, or diminished physical condition reduces the risk
for future violence; and any evidence of changed circumstances since the
inmate’s original sentencing in determining whether to grant the motion.9
Describing the bill’s purpose during a hearing in the Senate Committee on
Law and Justice, Senator and King County prosecutor Manka Dhingra
explained:
[Prosecutors] have a responsibility to do justice. Not simply get
convictions, not simply send individuals to prison, but to do
justice, for the victims, for the community, and yes, also, for the
defendant. We have learned a lot in the last 10, 20, 30, 40 years
about our criminal justice system. About trauma informed care,
about risk needs responsibility tools, behavior modification, about
implicit bias, about institutional and structural racism. This bill is
about ensuring that our dedicated, thoughtful prosecutors who are
tasked with doing justice have the tools they need to do simply
that—justice. This bill gives prosecutors the ability, the discretion,
to ask for an offender to be resentenced when the original sentence
no longer serves the interest of justice . . . This discretion is an
essential tool for prosecutors to provide justice in our community
and to make sure that we are learning from what history has taught
us.10
impose a sentence within the standard range. 13B SETH A. FINE, WASH. PRAC.,
CRIMINAL LAW § 42.5 (3d ed. 2020).
8 WASH. REV. CODE § 36.27.130 (2020).
9 Id.
10 Senate Law & Justice Committee, Public Hearing: SGA 9355, SGA 9357, SB 6316,
SB 6164, SB 6202, SB 6530 (Proposed Sub), TVW (Jan. 28, 2020, 10:00 AM),
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This article addresses, in the context of mass incarceration in Washington
State, the significance of providing justice in our community, the reasons
that prosecutors embracing their role as the ministers of justice is an
important tool, and the ways the use of this newfound tool will not only
serve to validate the redemption of many incarcerated individuals who have
changed their lives for the better, but will also provide redemption for our
criminal justice system by acknowledging and correcting sentencing
outcomes that no longer serve a valid purpose.
Part I begins with a case study of how a defendant, who was given a
cruel sentence of life in prison after committing a terrible crime when he
was fourteen years old, transformed himself in the decades after, thus
rendering his continued incarceration counterproductive; how the legal
system corrected its error of sentencing a child to a sentence with no
possibility of release; and how the defendant’s successful reintegration into
the community after twenty-seven years of confinement has benefited the
community. In Part II, we highlight the cause and effect of the absence of a
similar post-sentence review process for the vast majority of prisoners in
the Washington Department of Corrections, and how that has deteriorated
the health of our criminal justice system. In Part III, we illustrate how
powerful the human capacity for positive change is, despite one’s benighted
history in the community and record of criminal offending, and why our
system’s limited capacity to recognize and validate redemption is
counterproductive. Finally, in Part IV, we explore the powerful opportunity
that prosecutors have to move for these cases to be reexamined in light of
recent changes that depart from the Sentencing Reform Act.11
https://www.tvw.org/watch/?clientID=9375922947&eventID=2020011325&autoStartStr
eam=true [https://perma.cc/94KV-4SUH].
11 “The prosecutor of a county in which an offender was sentenced for a felony offense
may petition the sentencing court or the sentencing court’s successor to resentence the
offender if the original sentence no longer advances the interests of justice.” WASH. REV.
CODE. § 36.27.130(1) (2020).
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I. THE RELEVANCE OF REFORM IN A HEALTHY JUSTICE SYSTEM
On May 19, 1992, a terrible crime was committed.12 That afternoon, a
local Seattle businessman left the witness stand after testifying against a
teenager who had assaulted him in the late evening as he left his store
several months before.13 He still had a colostomy bag connected to his
abdomen due to the gunshot wound inflicted by his fifteen-year-old
assailant. The businessman, an immigrant from a war-torn country, was a
respected member of his community and had dreams of building a
prosperous life for his wife and children.14 Hours after leaving the King
County Juvenile Court, where his young assailant was convicted, he was
killed in his place of business by his teenage assailant’s younger brother,
Jeremiah Bourgeois.15 His business partner was shot too, but fortunately
survived his gunshot wounds.16
Jeremiah was fourteen years old when he committed this offense. Court
records revealed how in less than three years he became “a delinquent, then
a runaway, then a drug dealer, then a killer.”17 Originally charged in
juvenile court with murder in the first degree, he, as with his brother, faced
confinement until no later than his twenty-first birthday.18 Believing this
maximum sentence to be insufficient punishment, prosecutors moved to




14 Jeremiah Bourgeois, Breaking Good: How to Heal a Life Spent Behind Bars, CRIME
REP. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://thecrimereport.org/2017/08/29/breaking-good-how-to-heal-
a-life-spent-behind-bars/ [https://perma.cc/X99Z-XW3W].
15 Seven, supra note 12.
16 Id.
17 Jeremiah Bourgeois, The Irrelevance of Reform: Maturation in the Department of
Corrections, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 151 (2013).
18 State v. Bourgeois, 866 P.2d 43, 47 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); see also WASH. REV.
CODE. § 13.40.300 (2019) (providing that in no case may a juvenile offender be
committed by the juvenile court to the department of social and health services for
placement in a juvenile correctional institution beyond the juvenile offender’s twenty-
first birthday).
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have the case transferred to adult court where, upon conviction for murder
in the first degree, Jeremiah would instead face a mandatory minimum
sentence of twenty years.19 At the ensuing decline hearing, Jeremiah’s
probation officer voiced his belief that declining juvenile jurisdiction was
entirely appropriate, declaring, “[d]espite his small size, he is violent and
extremely aggressive, particularly when caught engaging in criminal
conduct. A hallmark of his many police reports is his use of flight,
intimidation[,] and violence to avoid apprehension.”20 Jeremiah’s mother
“made an impassioned but ultimately fruitless plea for J.J. to be treated as a
juvenile, telling how she had repeatedly asked for the courts’ help. Each
time, she was told J.J.’s crimes weren’t serious enough.”21 In the end, the
juvenile court judge agreed that Jeremiah should be tried as an adult, citing
the “aggressive, premeditated, and willful nature” of the offense.22
19 State v. Miller, 756 P.2d 122, 123 (Wash. 1988) overruled by State v. Barber, 248
P.3d 494 (Wash. 2011) (stating that “under RCW 9.94A.120(4) the mandatory minimum
term for first degree murder is 20 years.”);
See, e.g., State v. Holland, 635 P.2d 142, 148 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981), aff’d, 656 P.2d
1056 (Wash. 1983).
The seriousness and violent nature of the charged offenses, the substantial
indications of guilt, the defendant’s prior contacts with juvenile authorities, the
extensive evidence on the comparative rehabilitative services offered in the
adult and juvenile corrections programs, and the psychologists’ inability to
assure the public safety if the defendant was released at age 21 from
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction all point to the conclusion that the decline of
jurisdiction was warranted. Substantial evidence supports the decision of the
juvenile court.
Id.
20 Bourgeois, supra note 17.
21 Carey Quan Gelernter, Life Without Possibility¾A Young Teen’s Life Sentence for
Murder Raises the Questions: Could Intervention Have Helped? Would Rehabilitation
Help Now?, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 13, 1994),
https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/?date=19940213&slug=1894882
[https://perma.cc/26FJ-6TV6].
22 Richard Seven, 15-Year-Old May Face Death Penalty in Trial, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct.
3, 1992, at A16, https://infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/document-
view?p=WORLDNEWS&docref=news/0EB535DADC5FFED8&f=basic
[https://perma.cc/QWK7-CHXA].
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When arraigned in adult court, the murder charge was raised to the state’s
most serious offense and, consequently, Jeremiah became the youngest
person in King County to face trial for first-degree aggravated murder.23 His
attorney believed the charge was “absolutely inappropriate” in light of “the
extreme youthfulness of the boy” and because if convicted, Jeremiah would
die in prison.24 Conversely, prosecutors felt a mandatory sentence of life
without the possibility of parole was entirely appropriate given the
“aggravating factor was the killing of a court witness.”25 The prescient
nature of this statement later manifested when the survivor of the shooting
had to be arrested on a material-witness warrant so prosecutors could secure
his testimony.26 Following his arrest and confinement, the victim
emotionally explained to the judge, “Nothing is worse than losing my life,
so I didn’t want to be killed for testifying in court.”27 Later, “[s]everal
prosecution witnesses, including a man who lived across the street and
23 Id.; see also Erin Heffernan, New Law Puts Killer Who Got Life Sentence as a Teen on
Path to Parole, SEATTLE TIMES (June 20, 2014), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/new-law-puts-killer-who-got-life-sentence-as-a-teen-on-path-to-parole/
[https://perma.cc/AT9A-LJW7] (stating Jeremiah was the second youngest person to face
being sentenced to life without the possibility of parole); Medha Raman, Barry Massey,
Youngest Person Sentenced to Life, Talks with LSJ Students, UNIV. OF WASH. (Apr. 25,
2016), https://lsj.washington.edu/news/2016/04/25/barry-massey-youngest-person-
sentenced-life-talks-lsj-students [https://perma.cc/AF4R-X8V3] (stating the youngest
person to face a life sentence was Barry Massey, who was sentenced to this term of
confinement in Pierce County for crimes he committed at age thirteen).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 See State v. Bourgeois, 917 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1996), rev’d, 133 Wash. 2d 389, 945
P.2d 1120 (1997) (“At trial, the State began direct examination of its first witness,
Dagnew Andemichael, by asking, “Mr. Andemichael, do you want to be here today?”
Over objection, the State elicited that Andemichael had to be arrested and brought to trial
on a material witness warrant because he was afraid to testify.”).
27 Richard Seven, Survivor of Shooting Will Testify in Trial, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 26,
1993), https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/?date=19930326&slug=1692649
[https://perma.cc/BFR4-DHT5].
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identified Bourgeois as the killer shortly after the shooting, said they were
afraid to testify against him.”28
Jeremiah was convicted a year after his arrest and was sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole.29 His case produced almost a decade of
appeals and petitions for relief at both the state and federal level, none of
which were successful in undoing his sentence.30 In 2001, his appeals came
to an end. Thereafter, the only part of the criminal justice system that had
any interest in him was the Department of Corrections.
Although Jeremiah was set to die while imprisoned unless he received a
sentence commutation, he underwent an extraordinary transformation. His
early years in prison were defined by disciplinary misconduct and violent
behavior, including two separate convictions for custodial assault before the
28 Richard Seven, I Wasn’t Strong Enough, Father Says of Son’s Conviction—Jury Took




29 Matter of Bourgeois, No. 74850–5–I, 2017 WL 1315503 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 3,
2017) (“In 1992, 14–year-old Jeremiah Bourgeois participated in a murder. In 1993, he
was convicted of aggravated first degree murder and sentenced under RCW 10.95.030 to
life in prison without the possibility of parole or “any sort of good time calculation.”).
30 See State v. Bourgeois, supra note 26; In re Pers. Restraint of Bourgeois, No: 92–1–
06444–4, 2017 WL 1315503 at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2017) (denying Bourgeois’
personal restraint petition on the grounds that the Miller fix did not increase the quantum
of punishment and therefore did not violate the prohibition against ex post factor laws);
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age of twenty-three,31 but after a decade of confinement he later explained,
“The value of philosophy, law, and history impressed itself on my life when
I was drowning in the prison subculture, surrounded by nothing but bars
and facing nothing but time.”32 His ability to participate in rehabilitative
programs was limited due to correctional policies,33 but he still cobbled
together a higher education by obtaining donated textbooks from colleges
and universities, became a clerk in the law library to have unfettered access
to caselaw to study, and used the limited funds available to him to pay for
distance-learning courses to earn a bachelor’s degree.34
After twenty-two years of confinement, Jeremiah was given an
opportunity to be released due to legislative changes made in response to
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, a case which held
that it is unconstitutional to sentence juvenile offenders to mandatory terms
of life in prison without the possibility of parole for the commission of
homicide.35 His sentence was amended to an indeterminate life term with a
mandatory minimum of twenty-five years—making him eligible for parole
three years later.36 By age forty-two, Jeremiah had “become a model of
transformation. The violent boy grew into a thoughtful man, who, having
spent 25 years behind bars, wait[ed] on a state board to clear him for
31 In re Bourgeois, Jeremiah Joseph, No. 96-1-00129-4, 1996 BL (Wash. Super. Ct. May
15, 1996); In re Bourgeois, Jeremiah Joseph, No. 00-1-00122-2, 2000 BL (Wash. Super.
Ct. Apr. 10, 2000).
32 Bourgeois, supra note 17, at 154.
33 Jeremiah Bourgeois, The Irrelevance of Reform: Maturation in the Department of
Corrections, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 153 (2013); Jeremiah Bourgeois, A Janus-
Faced Approach: Correctional Resistance to Washington State’s Miller Fix, 15 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 451, 456 (2018).
34 Jeremiah Bourgeois, A Janus-Faced Approach: Correctional Resistance to
Washington State’s Miller Fix, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 451, 456 (2018); see also
Jeremiah Bourgeois, Starving for an Education, LINKEDIN (May 6, 2020),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/starving-education-jeremiah-bourgeois
[https://perma.cc/BPB6-QUTA].
35 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012).
36 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.95.035, .030(3)(a)(i) (2020).
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release.”37 He earned his bachelor’s degree, became a columnist for a
criminal justice news site, published several legal commentaries, advised a
non-profit that provided higher education to prisoners, and mentored those
around him.38 Jeremiah’s sentencing judge urged the parole board to set
him free.39 His prosecutor agreed and wished Jeremiah the best as he
transitioned to society.40 After twenty-seven years of confinement, at age
forty-two, Jeremiah was released.41 Immediately, he began working as a
paralegal, studied to take the Law School Admission Test, and advocated to
promote progressive policy changes in the criminal justice system.42 Seven
months later, Jeremiah became a JD candidate at Gonzaga University
School of Law.43
37 Levi Pulkkinen, Limbo: Seattle Man Who Killed at 14 Wonders if He’ll Be Freed,
SEATTLE PI (Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.seattlepi.com/seattlenews/article/Juvenile-
Justice-Life-Bourgeois-12779252.php [https://perma.cc/XLP8-3YG4].
38 See, e.g., Bourgeois, supra note 34, at 457; Jeremiah Bourgeois, Fourteen to Forty:
Creating Something out of Nothing, 29 J. PRISONERS ON PRISONS 13, 16–17 (2020);
Jeremiah Bourgeois, The Irrelevance of Reform: Maturation in the Department of
Corrections, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 154 (2013).
Now I write term papers and legal briefs that benefit both me and others
confined with me. My transformation has affected not only those who knew
me when I was a menace, but also those who are just starting to serve their
sentences. They see me as a role model and see what can be accomplished in
spite of one’s circumstances.
Id.
39 Wash. State Dep’t of Corr., Indeterminate Sentence Rev. Bd., Decision and Reasons,
Doc. # 708897 (Aug. 14, 2019), at 3 (on file with author); Letter from Judge Anthony P.
Wartnik (Retired), to Indeterminate Sentence Rev. Bd. (Aug. 11, 2017) (on file with
author).
40 King Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., FACEBOOK (Nov. 16, 2016),
https://www.facebook.com/kcprosecutor/posts/1251822544838469
[https://perma.cc/MA8R-W6UL].
41 Jeremiah Bourgeois, A (Not so Fond) Farewell to Prison Life, CRIME REP. (Oct. 28,
2019), https://thecrimereport.org/2019/10/28/a-not-so-fond-farewell-to-prison-life/
[https://perma.cc/69RJ-83AP].
42 Aimeé Muul, Jeremiah JJ Bourgeois Speaking on Why Parole is Needed in WA State,
YOUTUBE (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dWPBKRM18qg
[https://perma.cc/BZ2E-AEUV].
43 Jeremiah Bourgeois, From Prison to Law School: A Journey Tempered by Sadness–
And Anger, CRIME REP. (May 6, 2020), https://thecrimereport.org/2020/05/06/from-
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Jeremiah’s case demonstrates how much change can occur within those
who are sentenced for even violent offenses, and how prosecutors’ and
judges’ conceptions of justice is ever-evolving. Prosecutors determined
Jeremiah’s actions deserved a long punishment, especially the prosecutors
who were involved in the case directly. King County Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney Tami Perdue maintained with respect to Jeremiah’s original
sentence of life without the possibility of parole, “I think he deserves it. . . .
I looked into his eyes and saw nothing . . . I feel something is missing.”44
Yet the reality of transformation and redemption became manifested when
Jeremiah transformed from a teenage killer into a college educated
columnist. The King County Prosecutor then touted how decades after
being sentenced to die imprisoned, Jeremiah was critiquing the code of
silence that leads prisoners to turn a blind eye to cruelty. The Prosecutor
declared, “Jeremiah shares his insights into the prison experience and the
code of silence he witnessed. It is . . . remarkable. . . . We wish him the best
in his transition from prison to freedom next year.”45 Jeremiah’s release was
only made possible by legislative changes that made him eligible for release
based on evidence of reform. His case demonstrates that when it comes to
punishing people by using the most severe measure available—the loss of
liberty—we must have review systems in place, both to ensure that
continued confinement is no greater than necessary and to validate
redemption. The next section shows that, for most individuals who are
incarcerated in Washington’s prison system, there is no review system in
place to undo sentences that no longer serve the interests of justice.
prison-to-law-school-a-journey-tempered-by-sadness-and-anger [https://perma.cc/367M-
4UYM].
44 Gelernter, supra note 21.
45 King Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., supra note 40.
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II. WHEN REFORM BECOMES IRRELEVANT, THE SYSTEM SUFFERS
The United States is considered the incarceration nation for its
exceptionally large prison population.46 This reality is no different in
Washington State, where the incarceration rate has more than doubled since
the 1980s.47 As for the quantum of punishment, “[T]he public demand for
severe sentencing of certain classes of offenders has resulted in harsher
sentences…through ballot initiatives as well as some politically popular
actions of the Sentencing [Guidelines] Commission and the
legislature.”48 By 2019, 41.5% of all prisoners in Washington State were
serving a sentence of ten or more years and 17% of prisoners were serving a
life sentence.49
46 Lorna Collier, Incarceration Nation, 45 MONITOR ON PSYCH. 56 (Oct. 2014),
https://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/10/incarceration
https://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/10/incarceration [https://perma.cc/5EP3-7YUC].
47 Katherine Beckett & Heather Evans, ACLU OF WASH., ABOUT TIME: HOW LONG
AND LIFE SENTENCES FUEL MASS INCARCERATION IN WASHINGTON STATE 1 (2020),
https://www.aclu-wa.org/docs/about-time-how-long-and-life-sentences-fuel-mass-
incarceration-washington-state [https://perma.cc/47SV-4N7X].
48 Kate Smith, PRINCIPLES, PRAGMATISM, AND POLITICS: THE EVOLUTION OF
WASHINGTON STATE’S SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 76 Law & Contemp. Prob., no. 76,
2013, at 105, 125; see also David L. Fallon, THE EVOLUTION OF GOOD INTENTIONS: A
SUMMARY OF WASHINGTON STATE’S SENTENCING REFORM, 6 Fed. Sent. R. 147 (Nov.
1993) (“All guideline changes must be enacted by the legislature, which has amended the
sentencing laws every year since 1985.”).
49 Beckett & Evans, supra note 47, at 7.
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50
The increase in the prison population, largely due to legislative changes
in the 1980s, is problematic for a wide array of reasons, including logistical
issues,51 racial inequalities, and an ineffectiveness at promoting public
safety.52 After the Sentencing Reform Act was passed in 1984, incarceration
practices in Washington State changed dramatically when the state moved
away from a system that recognizes and rewards rehabilitation. This section
explores how specific laws have worked in conjunction with the Sentencing
Reform Act to increase the length of sentences as well as the number of life
50 Joshua Aiken, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, ERA OF MASS EXPANSION: WHY STATE
OFFICIALS SHOULD FIGHT JAIL GROWTH graph: Jail and Prison Incarceration Rates in
Washington 1978-2015 (May 31, 2017),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/graphs/WA_Prison_Jail_Rate_1978-2015.html
[https://perma.cc/3MSF-WDPL] (reproduced with permission from the Prison Policy
Initiative).
51 STEVE HERBERT, TOO EASY TO KEEP: LIFE-SENTENCED PRISONERS AND THE
FUTURE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2019).
52 Beckett & Evans, supra note 47, at 1–11.
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sentences administered in Washington, and how these sentences negatively
impact the community.
A. The History of Incarceration Since the Sentencing Reform Act.
The proliferation of life and long sentences was a direct result of the
Sentencing Reform Act. Passed in 1984, the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA)
was the outcome of increasing concerns that the state’s use of indeterminate
sentencing for felony cases was yielding inconsistent outcomes.53 This
legislative act created strict sentencing guidelines for adult felonies and
abolished the use of Washington State’s parole board.54 Thus, to create
more predictable outcomes, “[T]he state’s longstanding system of
expansive judicial and parole discretion was replaced with a set of statutory
sentencing guidelines enacted by the state legislature.”55 This legislation
emphasized incapacitation and retribution as the paramount goals of
punishment and “discounted rehabilitation.”56 While increasing sentence
lengths was not an explicit goal of the SRA, it did directly increase sentence
lengths by making life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) or the
death penalty the only options for aggravated murder cases.57 The SRA also
paved the way for multiple legislative changes in the 1990s that caused life
and long sentences to proliferate.58
While the SRA was consistent with legislation passed in Washington
State in 1975, it was a huge departure from past legal practices.59 Before
53 See id. at 12 (“The primary goal of the new sentencing system was to ensure that
defendants who commit similar crimes and have similar criminal histories receive similar
sentences.”).
54 Id.
55 Smith, supra note 49, at 107.
56 In reMota, 788 P.2d 538, 543 (1990) (citing commentators).
57 Beckett & Evans, supra note 47, at 12.
58 Id. at 15.
59 See Smith, supra note 49, at 107 (“With the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1981 (SRA), sentencing in Washington state underwent a radical transformation.”);
David Boerner & Roxanne Lieb, SENTENCING REFORM IN THE OTHER WASHINGTON, 28
Crime & Just. 71, 71–72 (2001) (“The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 rejected many
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1975, there was significantly more judicial discretion, and the existence of a
robust parole board demonstrated a belief in an individual’s ability to be
rehabilitated.60 Considering this history, it is important to note that changes
in sentencing laws after the passing of the SRA are a reflection of the
particular political and social climate existing at that time, and not a
reflection of justice as we have always seen it.
B. Laws that Increase Incarceration
While the Sentencing Reform Act contributed greatly to the proliferation
of both life and long sentences, other legislative changes have also
contributed to the significant increase in sentence lengths that we see
today.61 There have been four laws that have most significantly impacted
the increase in life and long sentences: The Persistent Offender
Accountability Act, Hard Time for Armed Crime Act, changes to offender
scores, and the auto-decline of youth offenders to adult courts.62 These laws
are the quartet of inequity.63
The Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA), also known as
Three-Strikes and You’re Out, was adopted by Washington State in 1993
and required courts to sentence “persistent offenders” to life without the
possibility of parole.64 POAA states that upon the third conviction for a
core tenets of indeterminate sentencing, putting into place a sentencing system based
on principles of just desert and accountability.”).
60 Smith, supra note 49, at 108–09.
61 Id. at 26.
62 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.570 (2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.533 (2020);
Smith, supra note 49, at 128 (“For instance, in the two decades between 1989 and 2008,
the average offender score rose from 1.4 to 2.9, a shift that appears to be due to legislated
changes in the way scores are calculated.”); see State v. Cornejo (In re Boot), 925 P.2d
964, 968 (1996) (“In 1994, the Legislature enacted comprehensive changes to state law
for the express purpose of deterring violent conduct. One of the areas addressed was the
Basic Juvenile Court Act, RCW 13.04. The Legislature amended RCW 13.04.030 to
bring certain offenses committed by 16- and 17-year-olds under the ‘exclusive original
jurisdiction’ of the adult criminal court.”).
63 Beckett & Evans, supra note 47, at 24–27.
64 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.570 (2000); Beckett & Evans, supra note 47, at 16.
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crime considered by the legislature to be a “most serious offense,” the
offender must be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.65 Crimes that are considered “most serious
offenses” include all Class A felonies, such as manslaughter and robbery
while brandishing a firearm, along with some Class B felonies.66
Additionally, it is considered a “most serious offense” if a Class B felony
includes a deadly weapon or they find there is a sexual motivation.67
Importantly, the idea that animated legislators was that crime would be
reduced by incapacitating repeat offenders and deterring potential
criminals.68 However, as discussed by Beckett in her expansive research
report About Time, there is no evidence to support either of these notions.69
Beyond lacking positive outcomes, studies have found multiple downfalls.70
One outcome of laws like the POAA is that defendants are dissuaded from
pleading guilty; instead, defendants are more likely to accept plea bargains
in order to avoid going to trial and receiving a strike.71 Thus, the Three-
Strikes law punishes individuals for utilizing their constitutionally protected
right to a trial by jury.
The Hard Time for Armed Crime Act also impacted sentence lengths by
further removing judicial discretion.72 Established by Initiative 159 and
passed in 1995, the Hard Time for Armed Crime Act (HTACA) established
mandatory sentence enhancements for all felony offenses committed while
using a weapon by adding time to the term of confinement imposed for the
base offense.73 The additional time for Class A felonies with a firearm
enhancement can amount to up to sixty months of additional confinement
65 Beckett & Evans, supra note 47, at 16.
66 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030 (2020).
67 Id.
68 Beckett & Evans, supra note 47, at 16.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 17.
71 Id.
72 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.533 (2020).
73 Beckett & Evans, supra note 47, at 19.
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that must be served consecutively and cannot be reduced for good
behavior.74 As with the POAA, there is little evidence to support the
impulses that motivated voters to support the adoption of the HTACA.75
Consequently, this law seems to arbitrarily add to the length of sentences
absent evidence of deterrence.
Another way in which Washington laws have directly impacted the
increase in sentence lengths was through a change in the calculation of
offender scores.76 The SRA dictates that sentences are determined by the
seriousness of the most serious offense and the defendant’s offender score,
which is determined by the number and seriousness of the defendant’s past
convictions and any other current offenses.77 There have been many
changes to how one’s offender score is calculated since the inception of the
SRA, and in all but one, the modifications have increased the defendants’
offender scores and thereby increased the aggregate terms of confinement
that must be served.78 Given that crime rates have been steadily falling
since the 1990s, this increase in offender scores seems to serve no purpose
other than to operationalize a heightened retributive ethos to further punish
offenders.79
Finally, the decision to auto-decline certain youth cases to adult courts
played a role in the increase in the prison population serving life or long
sentences.80 The Youth Violence Reduction Act, passed in 1994, had the
effect of transferring sixteen and seventeen-year-olds charged with certain
felonies to adult courts and, if they were convicted, sending them to state
prisons.81 This practice was studied at length by private organizations such
74 Id.
75 Id. at 20.
76 Smith, supra note 49, at 128.
77 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A589(1)(a) (2020).
78 Beckett & Evans, supra note 47, at 38.
79 Id. at 38–39.
80 Id. at 18.
81 Id.
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as the Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP), and those
findings revealed that transferring youths to the adult criminal justice
system not only decreased the well-being of juveniles in state prisons vis-à-
vis juvenile detention centers, but also made no significant change to
recidivism rates when compared to youth who were retained in the juvenile
system.82
C. The Impact of Life and Long Sentences
The proliferation of life and long sentences has had significant costs on
the system of incarceration and the communities that are meant to be
protected by the criminal justice system. For example, there are significant
logistical issues with housing an increasingly aging population. Professor
Steve Herbert from the University of Washington discusses these problems
with an aging population in his work Too Easy to Keep.83 According to
Herbert, the physical layout of prisons is not meant for elderly or immobile
prisoners, which creates greater burdens for all parties when housing these
prisoners, transferring them to other prisons, and moving them within the
facilities.84 Additionally, the orderly operation of prisons is undermined by
the security risks, greater uncertainty, and extra supervision costs that are
required since the elderly tend to have more medical emergencies.85
Herbert’s research also promotes the idea that older inmates age out of
crime and go through a maturation process that reduces their likelihood of
reoffending; therefore, it does not logistically or economically make sense
to maintain such a large elderly incarcerated population to protect public
safety.86
82 ELIZABETH DRAKE, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DECLINING JUVENILE COURT
JURISDICTION OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS (2013).
83 STEVE HERBERT, TOO EASY TO KEEP: LIFE-SENTENCED PRISONERS AND THE
FUTURE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2019).
84 Id. at 69.
85 Id. at 81.
86 Id. at 124–27.
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Racial disparities have also been associated with the increase in sentence
lengths throughout the state. Data from Beckett’s report demonstrates that
between January 1986 and June 2017, Black people represented only 3.5%
of the Washington State population, yet they represented 28% of those
sentenced to life without parole.87 This statistic demonstrates a clear racial
bias present in our sentencing practices notwithstanding one of the putative
bases for the SRA. Thus, while fair and consistent outcomes may have
initially been the goal animating the SRA and subsequent legislative
changes in the 1980s and 1990s, it is clear that the actual outcome has been
longer sentences that continue to produce bias and further racial inequity.
Crime victims have also fared poorly due to the overreliance on
incarceration as the means to make them whole. The common perception
tends to be that victims want the harshest sentence possible. However,
research tells us that victims tend to be more satisfied with a restorative
approach that includes open communication to help provide the perpetrator
with the opportunity to grow and achieve their release.88 This theory was
reinforced in a study published by the Alliance for Justice and Safety,
which found that 61% of crime victims support shorter prison sentences and
emphasize restorative approaches.89 It was found that even victims of
violent crimes overwhelmingly support rehabilitation over long prison
sentences.90
The increased financial burden on taxpayers and diversion of resources
from other public needs, like education, to sustain the imposition of life and
long sentences are alarming and unsustainable. Blagg highlights that each
“LWOP sentence will cost Washington State $51,193 each year for thirty
years (until age 55)…[and] [e]lderly prisoners over fifty-five are at least
87 Beckett & Evans, supra note 47, at 51.
88 Id. at 54–58.
89 Id. at 55.
90 Id.
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twice as costly to incarcerate as their younger peers.”91 For example, it will
cost Washington State $102,386 each year for a fifty-five-year-old prisoner
until their death at approximately age sixty-four.92 Based on these
calculations, “[T]he sum of the average cost of a life without parole
sentence in Washington State is $2,457,264 per prisoner.”93 Taxpayers are
now paying over $1.4 million more for each LWOP sentence when
compared to the cost of life sentences prior to the enactment of the SRA,
when the average life sentence cost taxpayers only $767,895 per prisoner
(in 2014 dollars) because, in part, the sentences provided some mechanism
for early release.94
Studies have shown, for example, that in 2013, “1,383 individuals were
serving either life without parole or a de facto life sentence in Washington
State.”95 Of those individuals, 704 were serving an official LWOP sentence
and 679 were serving a de facto LWOP.96 Since the average cost of
incarcerating a prisoner for a life sentence is $2,457,264, the total average
cost of incarcerating those 1,383 individuals is 3.9 billion dollars.97 The
cost was almost two-thirds less under the Pre-SRA system that afforded
prisoners a mechanism for early release.98 These costs cannot be justified
when we consider the data showing that the SRA and subsequent legislative
changes to increase sentences did not provide more public safety and equity
as hoped. Moreover, a system of punishment that provides no mechanism
for review of maturation both extinguishes hope and sends a deeply cynical
message to those who are incarcerated that they are incapable of reform.
The existence of hope is vital to the practice of incarceration and can be
91 Id. at 33.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 35.
95 Id. at 6.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 BLAGG ET AL., supra note 91, at 35.
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seen in letters to the Seattle Clemency Project, an organization that works to
provide pro-bono attorneys with incarcerated individuals hoping to achieve
clemency by Washington State’s governor. Grady Mitchell, an incarcerated
individual, stated in one letter that his lawyers and the possibility of
clemency has “restored my character, my faith, my goodness. It has
validated the forgiveness that I’ve sought for so long and questioned if God
really had. Hope is a powerful emotion that will conquer hate, evil, and
demolishes doubt.”99 In this quote, Mitchell beautifully captures the
importance of hope and provides the reminder that those who are
incarcerated are deserving of forgiveness and capable of rehabilitation.
However, hope has been slowly removed from Washington State’s prisons
with the removal of the parole board in 1984 and with severe limitations on
the ability to achieve sentence reductions for good behavior.
In summary, our system of punishment promoted rehabilitation and
viewed individuals as capable of growth and maturation prior to the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. However, after the SRA and other
legislative acts removed the goal of rehabilitation from our sentencing
scheme and dramatically increased sentence lengths, our prison population
became overcrowded and hopeless. Despite the abandonment of
rehabilitation as a goal of Washington’s sentencing system over the last
thirty years, many individuals in our prison system have still gone through
extraordinary periods of maturation.
III. POWERFUL EVIDENCE OF THE VALUE OF A SECOND LOOK FROM
THE FEW WHO HAVE ACCESS TO EARLY RELEASE
Jeremiah’s case falls within one of the three small classes of prisoners
who are eligible to apply for review to obtain early release. First, there is a
subset of prisoners who remain subject to Washington’s indeterminate
99 Letter from Grady Mitchell to Jon Zulauf, Seattle Clemency Project (June 27, 2020)
(on file with the Seattle Clemency Project).
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sentence scheme that was in place before parole was abolished in 1984.100
Second, there are two classes of juvenile offenders: those who committed
aggravated murder and those who can petition for release after serving
twenty years of confinement.101 Finally, there are sex offenders who can be
released upon completion of their minimum terms.102 However, the purpose
of these hearings is to determine whether the offender will serve more than
their determinate-plus sentence, not less, so it cannot be fairly characterized
as an early release process. There is no mechanism for review for most
prisoners in Washington other than to apply to the Governor for clemency,
a process that lacks capacity to hear the large number of cases that need
review.103
While Jeremiah’s transformation is extraordinary, it is in many respects
quite ordinary. There are many people serving long sentences in
Washington prisons who, like Jeremiah, have grown, healed, made amends,
and become more than the system expected them to be. The case of Eugene
Youngblood captures this reality. Indoctrinated into Los Angeles’ gang
culture when he was ten years old, Eugene was an easy target for
100 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.100 (2001).
101 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(3) (2015) (juveniles convicted of aggravated murder);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730 (2015) (juveniles serving more than twenty years of
confinement for crimes other than aggravated murder or for sex offenses under WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.94A.507 (2008)).
102 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.507 (2020).
103 The Clemency and Pardons Board is unpaid and only meets four times per year.
Bylaws of the Washington State Clemency and Pardons Board, ACCESS WASH. 1, 3
(Mar. 22, 2011),
https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/clemency_bylaws.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9BWS-YTJT]. Given those limitations, the Board only has capacity to
hold about fifty hearings per year. See Governor Inslee Clemency and Pardons Board,
ACCESS WASH.,
https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/Status%20Table%20for%20CPB%20we
bsite.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Z88-8NYN]. In stark contrast, before Washington abolished
parole, the parole board heard 5,000 cases annually. Sara Bernard, Inside the Fight to
Bring Parole Back to Washington State, SEATTLE WEEKLY (Feb. 22, 2017, 1:30 AM),
https://www.seattleweekly.com/news/inside-the-battle-to-bring-parole-back-to-
washington-state/ [https://perma.cc/P67U-V9AW].
The Retroactive Application of Justice 431
VOLUME 19 • ISSUE 2 • 2021
recruitment.104 His young life had been defined by abandonment by his
father when he was an infant, the imprisonment of his mother when he was
a toddler, and the death of his grandmother at age ten.105 Eugene then
became a “junior mascot” for the Crips street gang and came to perceive
them as his real family.106 Those family members trained him to be an
inner-city soldier.107 He was shot by rival gang members when he was
thirteen years old.108 He was a school dropout by the age of fifteen.109 He
had a lengthy juvenile history by the age of sixteen.110 Then, when Eugene
was eighteen years old, he conspired with two fellow Crips to kill two rival
gang members.111 Those rivals were subsequently murdered by Eugene’s
confederates.112 His culpability was considered to be below that of his two
codefendants, but the judge determined that the appropriate term of
confinement was a sixty-five-year sentence.113
Upon entering the Department of Corrections at the age of twenty, the
fact that Eugene would not be released until he was at least seventy-six
years old meant there was little incentive for him to demonstrate prosocial
behavior; yet, Eugene’s behavior highlights the U.S. Supreme Court’s
recognition that “as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness
that may dominate in younger years can subside.”114 From the age of twenty
104 Letter from Foster Pepper PLLC to Washington State Clemency and Pardons Board
and to Governor Inslee (Sept. 7, 2018) (on file with author) at 2.






111 Id. at 11.
112 Id. at 12.
113 The sixty-five-year sentence is an aggregate of three convictions, two counts of first-
degree murder, and one count of conspiracy to commit first- degree murder, for which he
received three consecutive terms of 284, 283, and 213 months of confinement. See Letter
from Foster Pepper PLLC to Washington State Clemency and Pardons Board and to
Governor Inslee, supra note 104, at 13.
114 Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993).
432 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
to twenty-six, he received sixty-five infractions; from age twenty-seven to
thirty-eight, he received eleven; from age thirty-nine to forty-five, he
received none.115 Eugene’s behavioral transformation, given his intrinsic
desire to change, followed that of other teenagers sentenced to de facto life
sentences. As members of the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board
explained regarding the maturation of the brain and the behavior of
prisoners:
[I]t’s very common for the first ten years that we see them acting
out in a variety of ways. Acting out for lack of a better term. That
they’re not conforming with prison. Often violence, fighting, gang
activity, but what we consistently see is at some point . . . the vast
majority, at some point, something happens in their mind and they
make a decision that they don’t want to live that way anymore.
And then there’s a shift, and that seems to happen somewhere
between age 25-30.116
At the same time that Eugene’s behavior reformed, mitigating evidence
developed. First, one of his codefendants was resentenced to a term of
confinement that resulted in him being freed.117 This occurred even though
that defendant’s culpability was deemed by the original sentencing judge to
be more egregious than that of Eugene’s. Second, developments in
neuroscience revealed that the brain is not fully developed until
approximately age twenty-five. By this logic, the actions of youths do not
equate to those committed by fully formed adults because of their capacity
for change, among other things.118 Third, developments in caselaw revealed
115 Letter from Foster Pepper PLLC to Washington State Clemency and Pardons Board
and to Governor Inslee, supra note 104, at 19.
116 Senate Human Services, Reentry & Rehabilitation Committee, Work Session:
Experience in Implementing the Miller Fix in Washington; Public Hearing: SB 5120, SB
5164, SB 5144, TVW, at 1:27:05 (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.tvw.org/watch/?clientID=9375922947&eventID=2019011232@autoStartStr
eam=true [https://perma.cc/YG3E-47GA].
117 Letter from Foster Pepper PLLC to Washington State Clemency and Pardons Board
and to Governor Inslee, supra note 104, at 19.
118 Id. at 14.
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that the sentencing judge had the discretion to run Eugene’s terms
concurrently as opposed to consecutively.119 This judicial decision was not
made until fourteen years after Eugene’s sentencing hearing occurred, but
had it been recognized at the time, it would have enabled the judge to
reduce Eugene’s term given his reduced level of culpability. Finally, the
evidence detailing the etiology of Eugene’s criminality was irrelevant at his
original sentencing hearing.120 Today, these factors coupled to “a
defendant’s youthfulness can support an exceptional sentence below the
standard range applicable to an adult felony defendant, and [a]” sentencing
court must exercise its discretion to decide when that is.”121
In 2018, Eugene’s efforts to become a “good man” rather than a “good
convict” became relevant to the calculus of punishment when his case was
presented to the Washington Clemency and Pardons Board. His petition
highlighted that he had dropped out of school at age fifteen, but upon
pursuing higher education in the penitentiary, he came to be described by
one of his professors as “one of the most intellectually gifted, hardworking,
and thoughtful students I have ever taught.”122 He had become a gang
interventionist and a mentor to other prisoners.123 Amongst the dozens of
supporters in the audience was Dr. Raquel Pinderhughes, a Professor of
Urban Planning at San Francisco State University.124 Dr. Pinderhughes is a
nationally recognized expert on the green economy and designer of an
119 See In Re Mulholland, 166 P.3d 677, 680–83 (2007) (holding a sentencing court may
order that multiple sentences for serious violent offenses run concurrently as an
exceptional sentence if it finds there are mitigating factors justifying such a sentence).
120 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.100 (1983); See State v. Law, 110 P.3d 717, 718 (2005)
(“Factors which are personal and unique to the particular defendant, but unrelated to the
crime, are not relevant under the SRA.”).
121 State v. O’Dell, 358 P.3d 359, 368 (2015).
122 Letter from Foster Pepper PLLC to Washington State Clemency and Pardons Board
and to Governor Inslee, supra note 104, at 5.
123 Id. at 5–6.
124 Washington State Clemency and Pardons Board, Quarterly Hearing: Commutation -
Eugene Youngblood; Pardon - Charles DeJohn, Michael D. Ormsbee (January 14, 2019),
https://www.tvw.org/watch/?eventID=2019061030.
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environmental sustainability program called Roots to Success that is offered
in prisons across the country.125 Eugene had become one of seven Master
Trainers in the program, and in her view, he was “the most serious, mature,
and effective instructor” amongst them.126 She further explained before the
Board:
Over the past nine years in which this program has existed, I have
worked in hundreds of prisons. I have trained thousands of
incarcerated instructors to teach their peers. Mr. Youngblood is
one of two instructors that I would identify as an extraordinary
teacher and professional. Let me repeat this, Eugene is one of two
individuals out of thousands of people that I have trained who I
would identify as truly extraordinary. His seriousness of purpose,
his dedication, his work ethic, his professional behavior, his
commitment to help others…is extraordinary and exemplary. I
hear this from staff…I hear this from his students…and I hear this
from the teachers he has trained.127
Judith Mandel, a former prosecutor who represented Eugene when she
was a public defender, had remained in contact with him throughout his
confinement. Out of thousands of former clients, this was the first time she
had ever felt compelled to come before the Board and advocate for a
prisoner’s release, and she declared, “I am a witness to Eugene’s struggles,
his commitment to educate himself, to understand his existential dilemmas,
and to deeply self-reflect on his decision to make judgments commensurate
with his need to live as a mature man.”128 The Kitsap County Prosecuting
125 Letter from Foster Pepper PLLC to Washington State Clemency and Pardons Board
and to Governor Inslee, supra note 104, Appendix A (Letter of Support – Raquel
Pinderhughes – Roots of Success – 12-2-17).
126 Id.
127 Washington State Clemency and Pardons Board, Quarterly Hearing: Commutation -
Eugene Youngblood; Pardon - Charles DeJohn, Michael D. Ormsbee, supra note 124
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Attorney’s Office, which tried and convicted Eugene, had also taken a hard
look at the case and acknowledged, “Mr. Youngblood has set forth a
persuasive statement of facts, easily compelling one to believe that at least
one of the goals of sentencing has been achieved—that is rehabilitation.”129
While Eugene could have taken the opportunity to highlight his
transformation and accolades when given the opportunity to speak to
members of the Board, he chose to instead focus on the harm that he caused
and to give voice to his remorse. Overwhelmed with emotion, he said:
I would like to say to [my teenage victims’] family, friends, and
even their community, that I am truly sorry and remorseful for the
murders that were committed and the senseless loss of their lives
on December the 20th 1991 . . . [I’m ashamed that] I had the
opportunity to take responsibility . . . and be accountable at the
time I was sentenced, and I wasn’t man enough to do it. . . . At the
time of my sentencing, I could only see Mr. Tyrone Darcheville
and Mr. Randall as mutual combatants—meaning . . . we were all
gang members . . . and therefore I minimized their lives. . . . It took
me about ten years into my incarceration before I could finally
realize that I was more than just a gang member. That I was
someone’s father. That I was someone’s son. That I was
someone’s nephew. And it was coming to that realization that
made me realize that Mr. Darcheville and Mr. Randall were also
someone’s sons. Someone’s father. Someone’s nephew. And while
I’ve had the opportunity to make extraordinary change in my life,
to leave gang membership behind, to start helping people, they
haven’t had that opportunity. And the reason they haven’t had that
opportunity is because . . . my choices . . . led to them losing their
lives.130
Eugene’s case demonstrates the beauty and resiliency of the human spirit.
Humans have the unique capacity to change despite facing the most
129 Washington State Clemency and Pardons Board, Quarterly Hearing, June 2018:
Commutation - Eugene Youngblood; Pardon - Charles DeJohn, Michael D. Ormsbee,
supra note 124 (statement of Paul Heer, Attorney, Foster Pepper PLLC).
130 Id. (statement of Eugene Youngblood, Petitioner).
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challenging circumstances. A healthy justice system must have a
mechanism to recognize and reward positive change. Ultimately, the
circumstances surrounding his original crime and sentencing, the release of
his codefendant, his transformation while in prison, and the subsequent
development of mitigating evidence demonstrate that what once seemed
just had become an injustice. The Clemency and Pardons Board found these
circumstances to be extraordinary and voted unanimously that the Governor
commute Eugene’s sentence.131 But while the clemency process provided a
mechanism for Eugene’s review, it does not have the capacity to handle the
large number of incarcerated individuals who are also in need of relief.
IV. THE POWER AND OPPORTUNITY PROSECUTORS HAVE TO
VALIDATE REDEMPTION AND CORRECT SENTENCES THAT DO NOT
SERVE A VALID PURPOSE
This year, there have been nationwide calls for reform to the criminal
justice system, from the enforcement stage, to bail, to charging and more.
While front-end reforms are necessary, it is also crucial that we not forget
the individuals who have already been through the trial and appellate
processes and are serving long sentences that no longer serve a purpose. By
actively using 6164,132 prosecutors have an opportunity and responsibility
to do just that.
As shown through Jeremiah’s and Eugene’s cases, maturation happens
over time and a healthy justice system must account for that. On the most
basic level, recognizing and rewarding redemption incentivizes prosocial
behavior, which is likely to improve how people in prison do their time.133
Moreover, the absence of a process that formally acknowledges
rehabilitation and growth is another form of injury that many incarcerated
131 Id. Governor Inslee followed the Clemency and Pardons Board recommendation,
granting Eugene Youngblood a conditional commutation on December 7, 2021.
132 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030 (2020).
133 A. Mitchell Polinsky, Deterrence and the Optimality of Rewarding Prisoners for
Good Behavior 2–3 (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Pol’y, Working Paper No. 15-023, 2015).
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individuals experience in the system. Among the incarcerated population,
there is a palpable sense that the system is designed solely to respond to
them when things go wrong, rather than to support a path to ensuring things
go right. The absence of a process that celebrates and rewards positive
progress reinforces that idea.
Further, like human beings, our system of punishment is fallible. Our
understanding of what constitutes just punishment evolves over time, as
does our understanding of how our system impacts those who are involved
in it. A healthy justice system must account for those changes. Through
6164, prosecutors have the power to address inequities in sentencing
outcomes based on how our sentencing practices and laws have evolved.
For example, when the Persistent Offender Act was first enacted in 1993,
prosecutors did not believe they had discretion to offer plea bargains, so
none were given for the first few years the law was in effect.134 After a few
years passed, prosecutors started using discretion when deciding to charge a
defendant with a third strike offense and began offering plea bargains as an
alternative to life in prison.135 The effect of the change in the practices of
prosecutors meant that there were dozens of individuals who were given life
sentences with no plea offer from 1993 to 1996.136 If these individuals had
committed the exact same crime five years later, they may have received a
plea offer and presumably a shorter sentence. Changes in prosecutors’
charging and litigation practices cannot be addressed through the appellate
process, but the inequitable outcomes for defendants are very real,
particularly for those serving very long sentences. This is precisely the kind
of inequity or harm a prosecutor should move to correct under 6164.
134 See Washington State Clemency and Pardons Board, Quarterly Hearing:
Commutation—Orlando Ahmes, Tina Weaver (June 13, 2014),
https://www.tvw.org/watch/?eventID=2014061031 [https://perma.cc/K8T4-Y4SN]
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Finally, in a post-conviction process there may be a greater potential for
victim healing through restorative justice practices, which prosecutors could
use to facilitate their decision-making process about re-sentencing. Unlike
during the trial and sentencing, where the adversarial process is at its peak
and emotions are raw for the victim and defendant, when many years have
passed and the defendant has found a path to rehabilitation, the defendant’s
remorse will be genuine. Additionally, with the passage of time, the victim
may be more open to and may find healing in an apology from the
defendant.
Rewarding rehabilitation and correcting outdated sentences will provide
more, not less, stability in our community. It will bring people home to their
families and end long separations. It will allow those who have found a path
to rehabilitation to give back to their community by sharing their skills,
experience, and wisdom with that community. And it will restore some faith
in the criminal justice system that has been eroded by hopeless sentences
with no meaningful opportunity for review.
V. CONCLUSION
The data regarding our system of punishment in Washington over the
past thirty years is clear. Removing a parole option for most prisoners and
systematically increasing prison sentences left us with a costly and
overcrowded system that fails to make victims whole and communities
safer. Fortunately, a diverse group of stakeholders are motivated to find a
way to restore mercy and justice to our system. As Los Angeles County
District Attorney George Gascon said in support of California’s
resentencing efforts, “The pursuit of justice is timeless, therefore this policy
will correct historic wrongs. Mass incarceration has broken families and
trapped communities in cycles of trauma and poverty. We must begin
undoing those failed policies by taking a second look at extreme
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sentences.”137 It is important that future legislative changes support
incarcerated individuals’ continued rehabilitation and decrease the overall
size of the prison population. But while widespread legislative change is
necessary, through 6164, Washington prosecutors have been given a tool to
begin delivering just outcomes immediately in cases where an individual’s
sentence no longer serves the interests of justice. Prosecutors have an
unprecedented opportunity to help undo mass incarceration. But bringing
about this result will require them to turn away from retributive
philosophies and to embrace a new role in the administration of justice—for
as William Faulkner aptly observed, “You cannot swim for new horizons
until you have courage to lose sight of the shore.”138
137 Press Release, Fair and Just Prosecution, Prosecutors Announce Groundbreaking
Resentencing Efforts to Reduce U.S. Mass Incarceration Epidemic (Dec. 7, 2020),
https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/FJP-Sentencing-Review-
Press-Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD7H-6DJ3].
138 Three Famous Short Novels by William Faulkner, PENGUIN RANDOM HOUSE,
https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/48434/three-famous-short-novels-by-
william-faulkner/ [https://perma.cc/B6KM-NMWR].
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